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RESEARCH ARTICLES
Market Collaboration: Finance, Culture, and Ethnography
after Neoliberalism
Annelise Riles

ABSTRACT In the wake of the disasters of March 2011, financial regulators and financial-risk management experts
in Japan expressed little hope that much could be done nor did they take great interest in defining possible policy
interventions. This curious response to regulatory crisis coincided with a new fascination with culturalist explanations
of financial markets, on the one hand, and a resort to what I term “data politics”—a politics of intensified data
collection—on the other. In this article, I analyze these developments as being exemplary of a new regulatory
moment characterized by a loss of faith in both free market regulation and state-led planning, as well as in expert
tools. I consider what might be the contribution of the anthropology of financial markets and ultimately argue for
what I term a “collaborative economy” as a way to retool both financial and anthropological expertise. [too big to
fail, risk, debt, finance, collaboration, Japan]
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RESUMEN Tras los desastres de marzo del 2011, reguladores financieros y expertos en manejo de riesgos financieros en Japón expresaron poca esperanza de que algo pudiera hacerse, y tampoco tomaron gran interés en
definir posible intervenciones en términos de polı́tica. Esta curiosa respuesta a una crisis regulatoria coincidió por
una lado, con una nueva fascinación con explicaciones culturalistas de los mercados financieros, y por otra, con el
recurrir a lo que llamo “polı́tica de información”— una polı́tica de intensificada colección de datos. En este artı́culo,
analizo estos desarrollos como ilustrativos de un nuevo momento regulatorio caracterizado por una pérdida de fe
tanto en la regulación del libre mercado y la planeación liderada por el estado como en las herramientas del experto.
Considero cuál puede ser la contribución de la antropologı́a de los mercados financieros, y últimamente argumento
a favor de lo que llamo “economı́a colaborativa” como una manera de reequipar tanto el conocimiento financiero
como antropológico. [excesivamente grande para fallar, riesgo, deuda, finanzas, colaboración, Japón]
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NO ENERGY

M

ay 2011, Tokyo. It is only a few weeks after a massive
earthquake and tsunami left thousands dead and many
more thousands homeless; reduced factories, roads, train
lines, and other crucial aspects of the national economic
infrastructure to rubble; and unleashed the worst nuclear
crisis since Chernobyl. I sit alone in my cubicle on the floor
reserved for foreign researchers at the Bank of Japan, Japan’s
central bank; the foreign economists who usually occupy
this floor have returned home to escape the radiation. It
is pitch dark everywhere beyond the immediate vicinity of
my desk, and the temperature is over 80 degrees, owing
to the government’s mandate that every corporation and
government agency must cut 15 percent of its power usage
to compensate for the outage of Fukushima.
My “assistant” monitors my every move—she checks my
computer regularly, requests a report on each conversation
with bank and nonbank employees, and follows up to find out
exactly what was discussed even in the case of meetings with
personal friends. Every day at 12:30, the entire team crowds
into the only working elevator that remains after the others
have been decommissioned to save power, and we head
to the darkened employee cafeteria, where we are served
vegetables from Fukushima province, which, according to
official government proclamations, are entirely safe.
At these lunches, people keep their eyes down and eat
quickly. Occasionally they crack a half-joke about government policy. I am repeatedly lectured on the failures of
United States free market ideology as evidenced by the financial crisis of 2008 in ways that oddly replay Occupy Wall
Street themes—the traders’ bonuses, the income gap between rich and poor, the politicians who are beholden to
the banks, et cetera. When we do talk Japanese regulatory
or fiscal policy, everyone insists again and again that there is
“no hope” for the given situation—no way out of the current
economic mess. The lights are never going back on again, I
am told.
My assignment at the research division of the central
bank, as announced by the confident and brilliant individual
responsible for negotiating the bank’s international agreements, was to conduct research on the “too big to fail”
problem—the problem of what to do about corporations or
financial institutions whose failure could destabilize one or
more entire economies. My role as a researcher, arranged
by a longtime informant who knew of my interest in supplementing a decade of interview-based ethnography with
full-time research inside the central bank, was something of
an experiment for both myself and my colleagues: the very
fact that there might be a place for a lawyer and an anthropologist, and a question to be answered about “too big to fail,”
was in itself new. Before 2011, every one of my informants,
to a person, had subscribed without question to the ideology
of the self-correcting free market, unfettered by regulation.
This ideology had animated their life work, their hopes for
their personal futures, their response to practical problems
large and small.

Yet by the early spring of 2011, something had
changed fundamentally in much the same way that Slavoj
Žižek (1993:234) describes the sudden but utterly fundamental and irreversible “collapse of the Big Other” in Romania in 1989 and Alexei Yurchak (2006) describes the moment
at which “everything that was forever” in Russia suddenly
“was no more.” By the spring of 2011, few of my longtime
friends seemed to recall, unless pressed into an embarrassing
moment of mea culpa, that they once had subscribed to such
a view. In what follows, I explore what this change of heart
might tell us about the current political moment—that is,
the moment after the collapse of pure faith in neoliberalism
and its implications for the challenges and contributions of
critical scholarship. Following Ulrich Beck (2009), Sheila
Jasanoff (1986), and others, my way into the problem is
through the question of the politicization of cultures of expertise in risk management (Miyazaki 2012). Since 2008, the
expert management of risk has become a major site of political controversy. From “Occupy Wall Street” (Juris 2012;
Nugent 2012; Razsa and Kurnik 2012) to “End the Fed”
(Paul 2009), to take examples from the United States alone,
once discrete cultures of expertise in risk management have
become targets of new political movements on both ends
of the political spectrum. I am interested in how political
and epistemological crises surrounding expert knowledge
generate new kinds of state–market arrangements and vice
versa. But I am equally interested in the consequences of
these developments for the expertise of the cultural critic as
market collaborator.
Along with the loss of faith in market competition as the most efficient and just decision-making tool
(Foucault 2010:118), there was also a loss of hope for the
future—individual or collective. Conversation with young
regulators about their own plans for their future career
paths inevitably petered out with comments like, “I don’t
really know,” or “I guess I will just stay here for a while,”
and conversation with colleagues about their hopes for their
children’s futures usually ended in resigned accounts of the
lack of good jobs, the lack of options, the fact that their
children’s future was sure to be darker than their own had
been. In the view of the regulators with whom I worked and
my interlocutors in the financial markets alike, the best that
one could aim for was to forestall an inevitable decline in
the economy and in one’s own life chances.
This turn of events, marked by an opening up of a new
space for me as collaborator, also destabilized my critical
faculties. The premise and the problem of my earlier ethnographic work had been the authority, efficacy, and legitimacy
of the market—of the zone of the private as against the state
over the last 20 years (Riles 2011a). One of the core themes
of my work had been the question of how to respond to
the Hayekian critique of state intervention in markets I had
heard articulated so forcefully by private and public actors
alike in the context of a time of widespread attack on the
legitimacy of the regulatory state. The economist Friedrich
Hayek, a veteran of totalitarianism who then championed
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democracy grounded in a market unfettered by state intrusion, focused his criticism of market regulation on questions of epistemology—on the inadequacy of the forms of
knowledge available to state planning (Hayek 1952). By definition, he argued, state actors could not adequately know
the market because by the time they gathered information
about market conditions, it was already obsolete. Because
their market knowledge was always retrospective, it was
inherently contradictory to the prospective orientation of
planning, and hence they could not intervene in the market effectively. The aggregate knowledge of private market
participants, in contrast, could fully coordinate the market
in real time through the collective wisdom embodied in the
nature of price. Market-based governance, therefore, was
more accurate and hence more efficacious.
Yet by the spring of 2011, it was clear that the political
bargain that undergirded state–market relations had changed
in important ways such that neither the political dangers that
motivated Hayek’s neoliberalism nor Hayek’s economic prescriptions animated people’s passions. In Japan, at least, the
old hegemony of free markets unfettered by state intervention has been superseded by something very different.
I naively search for what I might do to help at a time
of tremendous national suffering and need. Do they need
research in English on comparable problems or assistance
with letters or speeches for foreign consumption? Are there
any new research or policy questions beyond or different
from my agreed duties that demand immediate attention?
“Any new questions . . . that is a good one. I guess we should
come up with something,” the leader of my team flashes a
smile at a coworker, and I realize I have said something very
out of step. Mostly, things continue on, as if we were not in
the dark and the heat, and as if the radiation was not falling
and the aftershocks were not shaking our building.
In the weeks that followed, my colleagues seemed to
resist any sense of the extraordinary and energized crisis
moment, in which we the policy makers might emerge as
semiheroic subjects empowered and compelled to act on
behalf of the nation. Instead, my colleagues seemed to live
within a different time frame—one of a long, inevitable
decline, of a failure of agency, of no hope in the long run.1
The phrase repeated again and again was shouganai—there
is nothing to be done.2
In my last week of research, I met the only exception I encountered this time, either in government or the
market—a high-ranking official at the central bank. After
securing a meeting space away from others’ ears, he began by laying out his admittedly impressive credentials as a
Thatcherite privatizer. It was he who had single-handedly
dreamed up, and then executed, the privatization of Japan’s
postal service so reviled by the Left as an example of the dismantling of the state gone too far (Fukase and Tudor 2009).
It was he who had overseen the creation of new financial regulatory institutions devoted to the UK model of so-called
“light touch” market regulation with ex post facto laws.
Now he wanted help with an ambitious new project, he
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explained breathlessly, to fundamentally change the nature
of the Japanese people from passive, collectivist receivers
of government authority into individual risk takers—all
through the creation of new financial instruments that would
encourage consumers and banks to take more risk.
This was the kind of project that once would have titillated many of my informants in both government and the
private sector, and one offered by an individual who, at
the time of my first research, was a lion, a towering figure
among regulators. Now, however, my informants counseled
me to keep my distance from this individual. His enduring
free market views were out of favor, they told me. Nobody
bought that kind of project anymore, and so he had been quietly kicked upstairs—shuffled over from a more important
regulatory institution to a position in which it was hoped he
could do less damage.
Yet I was less sure than my informants about which
side to support. In the midst of the environmental and economic crisis of 2011, my colleagues’ lack of motivation to
try something—anything—a kind of personal and political
apathy, a lack of energy—troubled me. Why, at this moment of what would seem to be the resurrection of the state,
did regulators lack ambition, ideas, projects for saving the
nation at a time of crisis, even a sense of crisis itself?3 Why
did this ethos of shouganai—of a disempowered, deflected,
defeated subjectivity—pervade the bureaucracy? Why, at
this moment of what would seem to be a rebirth of the regulatory state of exception (Agamben 2005; Schmitt 2005),
did bureaucrats lack ambition, ideas, projects for saving the
nation, even a sense of crisis itself? Why instead the temporality of no hope (Miyazaki 2009) and the inward turn
toward a heightened monitoring of one another’s performance of the very same mundane tasks that had framed state
work in the time of free market ideology?
MARKET CULTURE

One of the interesting aspects of this moment of loss of
faith in the neoliberal project was the newfound affinity my
interlocutors perceived between their own task and mine,
and hence between the practices of market regulation and
the disciplinary orientation of anthropology. The word culture was on everyone’s lips. Japanese markets were different “because the culture is different,” I was told again and
again, in a way that would have sent the same informants
recoiling into counterclaims about the essentialistic arrogance and hegemonic orientation of culturalist explanations
a few years earlier. This time, my informants projected a
popularized version of familiar arguments in the social theory of financial markets concerning the many possible forms
of capitalism and their cultural articulation (Comaroff and
Comaroff 2000; Ong 2006; Vogel 1999; Žižek 2007).
This explicit turn to culture, and to an anthropological vision of markets, in the aftermath of a crisis of faith
in the predictive and regulatory power of economics and
law is now in itself a transnational phenomenon demanding
its own critical account. One hears incessant accusations,
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sometimes bolstered by professional anthropologists, concerning the problematic “culture of Wall Street,” and the
imperative to address the “culture” problem has given rise
to a new professional niche for anthropological consultants
within financial institutions as well as funding opportunities for diagnostic social scientific research. Within regional
and international organizations of financial regulators, likewise, the rise of so-called “New Governance” techniques for
global regulatory coordination, which purposely retool anthropological and sociological insights into an enforcement
regime in which states are “peer reviewed” and bureaucrats
“named and shamed” rather than legally punished or fined,
is yet another example of this turn away from law and economics and toward society and culture as a regulatory force
(Draghi 2011; Riles 2013; Walter 2010). There is a new
market for sociological and anthropological techniques for
making sense of markets as cultural spaces.
The material that follows, therefore, is in essence an
account of a failed collaboration along these lines—of a bold
experiment on the part of my colleagues to produce a new
account of the economy and of market differences that in
the end failed to produce the results for which they might
have hoped. Perhaps they just got the wrong anthropologist: I ultimately could not bring myself to produce the
cultural account they might have found ideologically useful, or at least intellectually interesting. And perhaps I was
wrong to resist: the new political and economic configuration I believe they hoped to enlist me in describing—
crystallized in the concept of “too big to fail”—indeed raises
profound political, policy, and ethical, not to mention intellectual, challenges. However, collaborations have long and
often unintended half-lives beyond the temporality of the
project, and hence as a first tack, I want to pursue, as an
ethnographic thought experiment, some of the lines of argument that we might have taken up together, after the quake
(Murakami 2003).
My assignment to study and write about the so-called
“too big to fail” problem was indeed topical since it was
and remains a central puzzle of current regulatory initiatives
around the world. One of the widely accepted lessons of
2008 among experts has been that certain financial institutions are too big, or too complex and interconnected with the
global economy, to be allowed to fail—and hence, for better
or worse, governments must step in and bail them out (de
Larosière 2009). But as transactors come to be recognized by
the state and by other transactors as too big to fail, they come
to have an increasingly explicit promise of support from the
state. When what the state will actually do at moments of
crisis is entirely known, corporations have less incentive to
meet their obligations (Johnson and Kwak 2011). Hence,
during the period of my fieldwork many large banks were
jockeying to be designated “too big to fail” so that they could
borrow more cheaply (because their creditors understood
they would not be allowed to fail; see Cox and Larsen 2011).
As the human and economic costs of the nuclear accident
began to become clear in the summer of 2011, however, “too

big to fail” took on a particular valence in Japan. It had also
become a euphemism among bureaucrats for Tokyo Electric
Power Company (hereafter, TEPCO), the electric company
that owned the Fukushima Daichi nuclear power plant and
that was now in danger of bankruptcy if it proved to be
responsible for the full damage caused by the nuclear crisis.
What my colleagues wanted from me was an academically
legitimate account of “too big to fail” as it looked to centrist
elites in Tokyo at that time: TEPCO was indeed too big to
fail; somehow or another, TEPCO would have to be saved,
either by legal arguments clearing TEPCO from liability,
by injections of taxpayer funds, or by securing concessions
from bondholders and banks (Morita 2012).
Yet TEPCO was too big to fail in a different sense than,
say, Lehman Brothers. First, was it really a private corporation? TEPCO’s actions were so closely intertwined with government policy, its employees so connected to government
officials, and its policies so collaboratively produced with
government officials that most of my informants immediately found the category of “private” somehow problematic.
Its mission—providing the power to every business, every
residence, every factory in the once-sparkling city of Tokyo
and providing the electricity that fueled Japan Inc., an industrial giant entirely lacking in natural energy resources—was
such a public one that TEPCO was too big to fail in the
way Japan itself was too big to fail, if indeed it was. Energy
was the unstated but ubiquitous backbone of the economy,
and the crucial collaborative task of the government and of
TEPCO was to ensure its plentiful supply. It followed that
the task of the resident anthropologist was to translate this
difference in the possible character of the “too big to fail”
problem to a North Atlantic audience in a way that might
make North Atlantic policymakers engaged in international
regulatory coordination aware of their own cultural biases,
their tendency to take their own specific institutional configurations as natural universals.
The fact of this utter interdependence of fates—of each
individual and enterprise, and of the market and state—was
represented financially as follows: TEPCO was one of the
largest issuers of corporate bonds purchased by other companies and banks at the direction of the government, and
TEPCO itself as well as these companies and banks together
held the vast majority of Japanese government bonds, such
that TEPCO’s failure would seriously hurt the economic interests of those to whom the Japanese state itself is so deeply
indebted (Miyazaki in press; Tett 2011). The ownership
structure is significant: neither private ownership nor collective ownership but, rather, an intractable web of mutual
obligations.
One necessary discursive task, then, was to articulate
what my interlocutors perceived as a different model than the
“North Atlantic” one of how and why corporations become
too big to fail—one that foregrounds the interrelation of the
corporation and the state from the start and that begins from
the standpoint of debt relations rather than capital relations
and hence of the vulnerability of all to one another’s potential
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failure. The anthropological contribution, therefore, might
have been to show that an important shift is taking place
from economic and political relations structured around
markets for capital, regulated at the margins by states—
intervening more or less from the sidelines depending on
whether the particular state ideology tends more toward
Keynes or toward Hayek—to debt economies in which states
are no longer marginal figures but are principal actors.
The desire for an account of debt as the new economic
paradigm is not at all uniquely Japanese. As the popular success of David Graeber’s Debt: The First 5,000 Years ( 2011)
suggests, the debt paradigm is now pervasive throughout the
financial world. The rethinking of economies as founded on
relations of debt rather than capital (and, in some cases, also
on reciprocity, altruism, affect, and the like), as well as the
return to earlier generations of foundational anthropological theories of debt economies for new inspiration, is now
attracting considerable attention among anthropologists and
social theorists as well (Dodd 2013; High 2012; Riles 2011b;
Roitman 2004; Sawyer and Gomez 2008).
This vision of corporations and states as enmeshed in
a web of debts (Graeber 2011; Roitman 2004; Sawyer and
Gomez 2008) forces us to ask whether a market economy is
at all the right description of the current economic situation
(Riles 2011b). Indeed, when market transactors around the
world complain that they are overwhelmed with bad debt,
they mean something very familiar to anthropologists who
study so-called debt economies—that is, that they are enmeshed in debt that only engenders further debts that can
never truly be repaid. And in fact, this is precisely the advantage as well as the conundrum of “too big to fail”: TEPCO’s
loans and bonds have such a low interest rate and such a
distant repayment horizon that they are in practice debts in
perpetuity. The sovereign’s debts, too, have been exposed
as beyond any possible horizon of repayment. The Japanese
government’s debt is exceedingly cheap (the effective interest rate is zero), and (unlike Greece or the United States, for
example) it is held almost entirely by domestic banks, corporations, and individuals who are themselves indebted to the
same debtor state (Benner 2011). Financial commentators
have suggested that Japan probably in fact never intends to
repay this debt and hence that this debt defies our “normal”
understanding of financial debt as a costly, temporary rental
of capital.
One point on which anthropologists, as experts in debt
economies, might contribute to the rethinking of the current
economic moment is in bringing into view a richer conception of accountability and legitimacy in conditions of debt
(Strathern 2004:94–102). From a Hayekian point of view,
this mutual entanglement of the state and the market is a
grave political problem, as much as an economic one—it is
the “road to serfdom,” a step on the path to totalitarianism
(Hayek 2007). And, indeed, today the deflated legitimacy of
both the market and the state is born out of shared dystopic
fates, in which each is guarantor of the other’s bad debts.
After the collapse of the distinction between public and
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private—between the market and the institutions that regulate it—engendered by this mutuality of debts, the state
alone encompasses all other forms of governance; it alone
has power and agency. Yet the anthropologist might respond
to Hayek with the insights of Marcel Mauss (2000) that the
compulsion toward reciprocity in exchange relations—the
compulsion to create and continually rejuvenate relations
based on debt and mutual obligation—is in fact the basis
of all ethics and sociality, the source of our humanity, and
what we can return to at points at which grand ideologies
fail us. From the point of view of the gift, the reimagination
of capitalist economies as debt economies engendered by
this dystopic moment would seem to open up a space for a
different kind of politics and ethics of the transaction.
Yet should we accept this mission? How alternative is
this alternative to capitalism? Does the very desire for the
alternative among regulators and traders not suggest that
the turn to capitalism’s “outside” in some sense holds out
the promise to re-energize the inside? Let’s linger on this
question for a moment while I turn to another aspect of the
political moment.
DATA POLITICS

My experience of being the target of surveillance was in no
way unique; rather, it turned out to be one of the most
salient, widely shared, and quotidian dimensions of daily life
for those working in the government as well as those working
inside the regulated banks. One legal compliance expert for
a large Japanese bank described how, in the last several
years, the number of government inspections, requests for
information, and requests for documentation and telephone
inquiries had increased so much that more than half his time
was now devoted simply to complying with daily, weekly,
quarterly, and yearly government requests for information.
His exhausted frustration was targeted in particular at the
“arrogant” tone of these government officials: “You can’t
refuse. When they make a demand, even one outside their
authority, you don’t even want to be the last one [among
the big banks] to comply. If you are slow, they punish you
ruthlessly. They have all the power. They are shoguns and
we are just common people.”4
And, indeed, some bureaucrats confirmed this description of a new informational politics. According to one central banker, the regulators ultimately had all the power they
needed because the Japanese corporation, as a subject of regulation, was entitled to no “business privacy”—regulators
had access to all the information about all the economic activity, all the time. They could and did monitor both sides
of every trade.
Whether, or to what extent, central bank officials actually had anything close to full information is not a question
I aim to answer. What is politically significant is that it was
now the ambition of some regulators to have total information in real time. Banking regulation as implemented by the
bureaucracy in Japan affords a wider latitude for regulators
to inspect and make demands for information than in the
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United States or in Europe. But in the past my interlocutors
often saw this authority as somewhat problematic—evidence
that they were still stuck in a developmental state moment
and had not fully embraced a more advanced neoliberal
approach.
The new emphasis on constant, total surveillance—“no
business privacy”—was jarring to me from the point of view
of the world of regulators I described in Collateral Knowledge
(Riles 2011a) in which the regulator’s dream was to withdraw from the market altogether and bring the Hayekian
vision of the rule of law to full fruition. My interlocutors’
vision of market regulation was now a darker one in which
private actors had to be monitored all the time. Indeed, in the
spring of 2011, I often heard high-ranking regulators say—in
a way eerily evocative of leftist postcrisis arguments—that
the only way to make large profits in the financial markets
was to cheat and, hence, that the job of regulators was to
manage the market imbalances—first, by catching this bad
behavior as soon as it happened and, second, by spreading
the costs and benefits of capitalism around, reallocating the
fates of winners and losers toward some kind of equilibrium.
This turn to surveillance as an explicit modality of governance is not at all uniquely Japanese; it also has been
recognized by social critics in Europe and the United States
as indicative of a moment in which neoliberalism “appears
to be in retreat, giving way to a darker vision of society harnessed to the valorization of policing as the primary mechanism of governance” (Hyatt 2012:209; cf. Wolin 2010).
And as emerging social criticism of companies from Google
to Facebook suggests, this modality of governance is not the
purview of the state alone.
Yet what was interesting was not simply the quantity
of information but the tools by which it was obtained. The
first of these was massive computerized nets for day-today, transaction-by-transaction, data collection. One of the
sources of central banks’ authority was the fact that interbank
transactions clear through accounts at the central bank. This
clearing mechanism was a source of data—complete data,
not samples or estimates—about market activity. These data
were collected collaterally to the work of clearing but had
value, authority, and a source of power all their own (Maurer 2012).
A second method of surveillance was what Douglas Holmes and George Marcus have described as the
“paraethnographic method” (Holmes and Marcus 2005).
Regulators of different ages and ranks were assigned to engage their counterparts at the major banks—they called them
daily, visited them weekly or biweekly, built relationships,
immersed themselves in the detail, made it their business
to know everything big and small before it even “happened”
as a market event. For Holmes’s interlocutors engaged in
designing monetary policy, paraethnography served as a supplement to macroeconomic modeling, a way to understand
the general state of the economy as a whole. For the regulatory experts with whom I worked, paraethnography served
rather as an alternative to law, a way to understand what indi-

vidual market participants were up to—either to anticipate
and resolve problems or to catch and stop bad behavior.
In such conditions, traditional lines of criticism seem
somewhat out of step; there is little “archaeology” left for
critics of capitalism to do. Foucauldian critiques of seemingly
innocuous surveillance regimes (Foucault 1979) proved effective enough when the target was the neoliberal state,
which claimed to withdraw, passively and even-handedly,
from the market. But what happens when surveillance is
no longer hidden but explicit, accepted by the targets, and
even applauded by left-leaning interest groups as evidence of
the state finally doing its job and keeping tabs on financiers?
As one centrist law professor put it to me: “What’s so bad
about monitoring?” The politics is no longer subterranean
but on the surface for all to see and, indeed, has already been
accepted as just the way things are and should be done.
Perhaps, then, the conversation with my collaborators
might have turned to what anthropologists know about debt
economies: Mauss and many others after him have shown that
what makes debt relations ethical is that they are relations of
two sides—two sides that recognize one another’s autonomy
and dignity (Mauss 2000:111). As Marilyn Strathern (1988)
has argued, in gift exchange (ironically, we might add, as
in liberal capitalism), the Other (the exchange partner) is
opaque—you don’t go asking where the gifts you received
or the commodities you procured in the market come from
or what divisions or politics lay behind them (although you
could and might at other moments not of transaction but
of critique). In that sense, that Other becomes legitimate in
precisely the way in which the corporation’s legal personhood was until recently deemed legitimate—the legal fiction
of corporate personality stands for the fact that the state will
not “pierce the corporate veil” (Riles 2011b). Granting this
kind of autonomy and legitimacy to another—a competitor,
an exchange partner, an enemy—allows that other to be
continually re-created, even rejuvenated, and this is why for
anthropologists exchange is the basic human unit of ethics and
sociality (Miyazaki 2010). The anthropological point about
data politics might be, then, that it is not the current state of
mutual indebtedness—the recent collective discovery that
markets are not really markets but debt relations—that is
the source of our political predicament as, ironically, critics
on both the far right and the far left are now suggesting. The
problem is rather the way we are going about being indebted
to one another and, in particular, the way we lose our dignity when we lose our opacity—our (business or personal)
privacy.
WHEN EXPERTISE FAILS

Yet here is why I could not follow through with this collaboration with financiers around cultural approaches to finance,
alternatives to capitalism, and diverse cultures of capitalism and debt economies (e.g., Appadurai 2012): in debt
economies, debts are highly calculable, rememberable, and
liveable, and it is this calculability that engenders sociality. What made TEPCO too big to fail—and, indeed, what
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makes all cases of too big to fail so precarious—was precisely
that the debts, the harms, the risks, were beyond calculation.
The issue was not the move to debt but, rather, the move to
a regime of incalculability.
Indeed, TEPCO’s debts, incalculable yet real as they
were, made visible the utter failure of the expertise of risk
calculation: the legal discussion surrounding Fukushima centered on the question of who bore responsibility for a harm
that expert knowledge said was so statistically improbable
that it was in effect impossible—and yet had nonetheless already happened (Morita 2012).5 In such a condition, it is not
surprising that civil society groups on all sides of the political
spectrum, the media, and even the experts themselves had
lost faith in any “hierarchy of knowledge” (Beck 2009:33)
premised on the “superiority of the expert” over ordinary
ways of knowing.
I began to fear that to gloss this particular debt through
the vocabulary of debt economies would constitute collaboration in the uglier sense of the term—something more
attune to co-optation. In the end, therefore, I did not produce an account of cultures of indebtedness; I chose instead
to write an oblique bureaucratic critique of the regulator’s
desire for culture in the form of a critical evaluation of the
sociological turn in global financial governance (Riles 2013).
Yet this ethnographic encounter demands more than simply
accepting or refusing my informants’ invitation to collaboration; it also demands a critical account of the cultural turn
in finance itself.
For risk experts, the incalculability of risk is the hallmark of the failure of their expertise. The turn to big data—
to gathering all the market information, rather than sampling or simulating or modeling, and to paraethnography as
surveillance—is also a reflection of a loss of confidence in
prior forms of expertise on which models, simulations, and
samples are premised. The rise of “big data” as the new socalled “fourth paradigm” for research, heralded by information scientists as after and beyond earlier research paradigms
of empiricism, theory, and simulation (Gray 2009), seems
to be bursting with bravado.6 But from another point of
view, the idea that the experts would abdicate to the data
control even over the hypothesis—would allow the hypothesis to emerge from the data rather than vice versa—is a
profoundly humbling moment in the history of expertise.
Indeed, it is important to understand that the new
surveillance of the excesses of the market was not
paternalism—my interlocutors in the bureaucracy in the
spring of 2011 were not claiming that they had the regulatory answers, could plan for the future, could do any better than market participants in salvaging the market (Wapshott 2012:193–195). Such a faith in the epistemology of
“the plan”—the hallmark of the Keynesian developmental
state period in Japanese political economy running roughly
from the end of the occupation until the late 1980s—had
been definitively defeated in the neoliberal era that I chronicled in Collateral Knowledge (2011a). But my interlocutors’
focus on total surveillance now also suggested a loss of faith
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in Hayekian competition and price as objective sources of
information. Both an earlier generation of Keynesians and
a more recent generation of Hayekians had held to ideologies that translated into a kind of actionable hope—for the
market-state system as a totality and for the professional
caught in that system. In contrast, this was a moment in
which hope for the market–state relation and hope for oneself as either a regulator or a market transactor in that sense
had been lost. Manic surveillance is a strategy of desperation, born out of a lack of faith in one’s theories and policies
or, rather, out of having to accept that one’s actions do not
conform to one’s theories of how one should act. Shouganai.
What is ultimately most salient about “too big to fail”
then is that the very recognition of the practical reality of the
obligation on the part of the state to save private entities from
failure plunges the expert into a kind of ideological anomie.
The “too big to fail” problem forces regulators and market
participants who had steadfastly believed in the Hayekian
vision of the preferability of the market as a mechanism
for coordinating risk to accept that states—their funds and
regulation—are integral to markets, and hence that the fates
of states and markets are entirely intertwined (Issing 2012).
This is a complicated, even intellectually corrupting, thing
to accept: the necessity for state agents to act in a way that
is indefensible according to their own ideological commitments (Morita 2012). And yet for my interlocutors, as for
U.S. free marketeers running the Federal Reserve in 2008
when they were also forced to violate their own free market
principles to bail out the financial institutions, an expert was
a person who had suffered this loss of faith in one’s theory
and by extension a loss of moral high ground about the justifiability of one’s own actions and yet was willing to live with
this practical cynicism. “There are no atheists in foxholes
and no ideologues in financial crises,” Ben Bernanke told his
staff in the midst of the U.S. financial bailout (Baker 2008).
The ideological purists on the left and the right—from the
Occupy Wall Street to End the Fed movements—were not
grown up enough to face the facts.
Ironically, it is this cynical expertise that now seems to
have such an avid appetite for culture. How should we understand this? Fieldwork conversations with lawyers, legal theorists, and regulators as well as extensive analyses of legal and
economic texts in which “culture” is referenced (Riles 2004,
2006a) have taught me that it is an ethnographic error to
assume that the term culture indexes anything that anthropologists might wish to claim as the province of their own
expertise. Technocracy presumes a certain degree of faith
in rational actors—in an economistic view of the world—
because if actors are not rational they will not respond to
the carrots or sticks technocrats offer them. However, almost everyone acknowledges that the rational possessory
individual model cannot explain everything. Hence, culture
functions as a placeholder for what is not knowable within
the dominant paradigm (Riles 2013): it simply stands for
anything and everything that cannot be explained within
the dominant rational actor paradigm as well as any and
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every possible method exploring such phenomena.7 This is
an essentially negative gap filling view of culture. That is, culture is necessary, but it is also always ultimately subordinate
to economic analysis.8 The desire for culture at the current moment then operationalizes a folk division between
culture and economy, or culture and rationality, that antedates anthropology (Davydd Greenwood, personal communication, March 7, 2013). When regulators or market
participants indicate an interest in culture, then, they are
simply pausing to recognize, provisionally, the gaps in their
analyses. What makes this confusing and tempting for the
professional anthropologist is the overlap in terminology and
mission. Anthropologists, too, talk about culture and consider themselves experts on and even professional stand-ins
for the Other.
Rather than take up the call to “fill in the gaps in the
form” (Riles 2001) with debt and culture, then, I wonder if
we might instead come to ethnographic terms with what has
happened to risk expertise and to risk experts themselves.
To do so, however, will require incorporating into our
account the newfound but equally powerful desire on the
part of many anthropologists and cultural critics to be part
of the action—to collaborate with financial experts around
the cultural turn. Let me explain what I mean with reference
once again to the situation after Fukushima.
CITIZEN COLLABORATION

As I mentioned, my office was pitch black, but so was my
home: in the spring of 2011, as the government experts
proved incapable of shutting Fukushima down, the only
positive policy proposal was energy conservation. At this
moment of political crisis, citizens were entreated to act collaboratively rather than point fingers (Sakai 2011). Private
companies were forced and individuals were admonished to
conserve at least 15 percent of their prior power usage by
turning off televisions and computers, raising the thermostat, and using the stairs rather than the elevator. We threw
ourselves into this project with a tragic energy, as if it was
all we could do. Each morning, the Asahi newspaper’s website published statistics about conservation numbers, and,
sure enough, the people conserved enough to make up for
the lost power source. Activist groups began talking about
the magical 30 percent—the amount of conservation we
would need to achieve to shut down nuclear power altogether. But in this somewhat hopeful project, we citizens
were also enlisted as collaborators, made responsible for the
government’s longstanding task of energizing the economy
(without, of course, truly having any say over what that
energy policy might become).
The same was true of the question of defining the risks.
Each morning, the government released a deluge of data
about sievert counts of radiation—here and there, taken in
this and that system of radiation counting, taken by different
government authorities who reported vastly different numbers. The data were dumped on us on government websites,
in huge spreadsheets without analysis or interpretation: here

are “the facts”; you decide. Like many others, I found myself thrown down a rabbit hole of statistical interpretation,
Internet searches, and academic research in my attempt to
answer the simple question of whether it was safe for my
son to go to school that day. The answer was always the
same: Who knows? And yet, like others, I could not curb
the compulsion to obtain and attempt to analyze the facts
(Morita et al. in press; Petryna 2002). This was not citizen
science (Jasanoff 2007) but the enrollment of the citizenry
in state disinformation through the flip side of data politics
as surveillance—data politics as transparency.
Now, one might say that after almost two decades of
engagement with science studies, I should have known better than to waste my sanity on a question as preposterous
as “is it safe?” And, indeed, I was aware at the moment of
all the ways in which the very project of this question was
nothing but a sociotechnical network rigged with glitches at
every turn (Riles 2011a). Yet my faith in my own theoretical
apparatus was not strong enough, nor did it offer me enough
in the way of alternative techniques, to counter the urge for
a scientific answer. This is ethnographically significant: at
the moment at which anthropological expertise is called into
collaboration, that expertise also failed this expert. At the
same time, other aspects of our tool kit—including, in particular, critical studies of expert knowledge as a modality of
governmentality—seem to have been exceeded by phenomena such as data politics. With the collapse of risk experts’
tools—the recognition by all that experts fail—we critics
also find that our tools for critiquing risk expertise become
somewhat beside the point. And for me, the most potent of
all was my loss of my most treasured expert tool, my ability
to see the condition ethnographically. I became angry more
than curious. I could see only the thing in front of me, not
the shape created by the gaps in the form (Riles 2001). This
was my analog to their loss of risk expertise.
In such a condition, to plow ahead with the collaboration, heeding the call to fill out the gaps in the economic
models with culture, or debt, would have been absurd. It
would have been my own no-crisis moment, my own expert cynicism, trundling on without acknowledging how the
tools that enabled such a perspective were already displaced
and undone.
THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY

From transnational anime studios (Condry 2012) to
crowdsourcing, collaboration—working with the Other—
is the post–financial crisis platform (Allal-Chérif and
Maira 2011:865), the new institutional and intellectual idiom, for activity once coordinated through the market. The
so-called “collaborative economy” is one that is “more about
the use of something than the ownership of it” (Chase 2012;
see also Botsman and Rogers 2010): consumers share cars
rather than own them outright, for example. But it is not
just a consumptive phenomenon; it is also about a different way of imagining production, from mobile phone apps
in which people share restaurant reviews or gas prices to
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peer-to-peer lending, to artwork that is coproduced by
strangers with different forms of expertise. “Collaboration”
is also the paradigm of the moment in management studies, where it was introduced a decade ago as an alternative to command-and-control organizational approaches in
global supply chains, e-commerce, and Internet-based team
collaboration (e.g., Basu 2001; Hansen and Nohria 2004;
Mahoney 2001). As a cheerful article in the Japan Times
puts it:
The more people are participating, and the more diverse their
areas of expertise, the better this model will work. And because
there’s so much diversity and openness, the collaborative economy is all about flexibility and experimentation, and, as a result,
adaptation and evolution. What we’re finding everywhere is that
people have a real desire and ability to participate in the economy as producers—and not just consumers—of goods, and are
providing products and services among and between themselves.
[Chase 2012]

A desire to participate as producers. What the collaborative
economy captures is the enrollment of market participants
in data politics, under conditions in which the state is as deflated, as weak, as the neoliberal state, despite its newfound
ubiquity.
The paradigm of neoclassical economic theory was not
collaboration but coordination. The market itself was imagined as a tool of human coordination, as were key institutional and conceptual building blocks of the market such as
the institution of price, on the one hand, and the concept of
private property rights, on the other hand. Debates among
successive generations and political camps of economists
were premised on this shared commitment to the analysis of
the problems and potentialities of coordination.9
It is this coordinated economy, and its associated intellectual projects, that has slowly eroded to the point
of collapse. Coordination as an institutional project has
been replaced by governance through data politics and
the enrollment of the citizenry in data collection and
autointerpretation—a kind of merger of the institutional
and descriptive dimensions of markets. Here, data about
markets become a matter of a different order, become constitutive of markets in a more immediate way.
When institutions collapse into representations—
planning into data politics—then collaborative thinking becomes constitutive and constitutional; it becomes the platform (Benkler 2006; Thrift 2006). It is, in other words, the
“alternative” that market professionals so desperately seek
from anthropology and the humanities at this moment, precisely because one cannot collaborate with others who are
just like oneself; the aesthetic turns on some sort of difference
(difference of expertise, difference of culture, strangerhood,
etc.; e.g., Bauwens 2005). Collaboration eclipses community, market, institution: it becomes its own politics—albeit
one that is merely a format, a platform—no more stable, no
more foundational, than that.
Scholarly paradigms—from early anthropological theories of the gift (Mauss 2000) to debates about the rel-
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ative merits of formalist (Cook 1966; Schneider 1975)
and substantivist (Dalton 1961; Polanyi 1944) approaches
to the economy, to the discovery of networked sociality
(Barnes 1968; Blok 1973; Mitchell 1973; Scott 1991)—are,
in both their form and their theoretical substance, reflections of the markets from which they emerge; hence, it
should be no surprise that the collaborative economy is already impacting the anthropology of expertise. Chris Kelty,
for example, has mounted a sophisticated multidisciplinary
collaborative apparatus modeled on the Linux software production model, with the organizing methodological challenge “of dealing with huge volumes of information—not
only as a consumer of information, but as a producer as
well” (2009:187) and with the specific intent of producing
scholarship that, like Linux, would integrate the creativity
of the intellectual crowd into something far greater than the
sum of its parts. Paul Rabinow likewise has recently written a
book-length account of his own failed collaborations—with
scientists in the ethnographic venture and with students in
the pedagogical one (Rabinow 2011). Where Kelty borrows
his method from his subject matter—big data—Rabinow
understood his collaborative role vis-à-vis scientists as supplying a set of ideas, a critical perspective on science.
Such projects literalize a set of longstanding methodological commitments in the discipline. As George Marcus
writes:
Collaborations have always been integral to the pursuit of individual fieldwork projects. . . . They never have been, however,
an explicit aspect or norm of anthropology’s culture of metamethod. The fieldworker, for example, is not held accountable or
judged by the quality of his collaborations and his ability to manage
them. Yet, today, collaborations of various kinds are increasingly
both the medium and objects of fieldwork. [Marcus 2009:29]

Indeed, the theoretical foundation for this work predates
the collaborative economy to the theorization of culture
itself as the dialogical invention of subject and object
(Field 2010; Strathern 1988; Tedlock and Mannheim 1995;
Wagner 1975). If “culture” is understood in Wagner’s terms
as the “field”—the intellectual premise for research—and
also as dialogical effect of anthropologists’ collaboration with
their interlocutors, then, in retrospect, it has always been
collaboration—the transformation of social relations into
analytical relations (Strathern 1995)—not culture, or theories of debt, that is our great disciplinary contribution.10
One of the hallmarks of much collaborative anthropology seems to be that the traditional aesthetics of anthropological expertise—the division between the sphere of
data collection and the sphere of theorization—have been
productively eclipsed by other approaches to theorization.
Joanne Rappaport speaks of “collaboration as a space for the
co-production of theory” (2008:2). As she explains,
I purposefully emphasize this process as one of theory building
and not simply coanalysis in order to highlight the fact that such
an operation involves the creation of abstract forms of thought
similar in nature and intent to the theories created by anthropologists, although they partially originate in other traditions and in
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nonacademic contexts. Understood in this sense, collaboration
converts the space of fieldwork from one of data collection to one
of co-conceptualization. [Rappaport 2008:5]

Kelty frames the same condition in terms of a challenge for
research:
In the age of inter-, trans-, multi-, and anti-disciplinary critique
and innovation, however, the question is raised anew: If not
by discipline, then how does one identify a significant problem,
how does one become satisfied with the appropriate methods
of research to pursue such problems, indeed, how does one
determine to whom one is speaking about these problems and
for what purpose, in the absence of strong disciplinary signals?
[Kelty 2009:189]

And yet there always remains a need for “disciplinary distinctiveness” (Reddy 2008:58): ethnographic response begins with an appreciation of the ways in which ethnographers
and their collaborators are not the same kinds of thinkers
and actors; the beginning points and ending points of their
shared knowledge are not the same (Riles 2006a). Rappaport gives the prescient example of discourses of culture
among the indigenous activists with whom she collaborated.
She points out that the confusion lies in our assumption that
their expert term, culture, is the same as our own expert
term of the same name:
This is not a strategic deployment of essentializing discourses to
describe what exists “out there” but a model of what “should be,”
a blueprint for the future. As a result, indigenous activists’ deployments of culture cannot be equated with ethnography. Their
purpose is different. While ethnographers engage in cultural description with an eye to analyzing it, indigenous autoethnographers
study culture to act upon it. [Rappaport 2008:21]

The anthropological collaboration differs in one other
important sense from the collaborations of the new platforms: anthropological collaboration can never be straightforwardly instrumental. By definition, in ethnography, one
does not quite know what one is looking for—or, rather, one
is open to letting the questions emerge from the intersubjective encounter. The only goals of the ethnographer are more
provisional: mastering the indigenous discourse enough to
get by, enrolling necessary local and global allies in the research project (Reddy 2008), or “finding the truth” about a
particular episode in local history, for example. These are
“as if” goals because they are both actual goals and impossibilities (there is no singular truth; it is impossible to master the
indigenous discourse), yet as such they stand in the place of,
and hence obviate the need for, actual instrumentalism. Is
there anything that anthropologists might contribute, from
this vantage point, to the current moment, of big data and
the collaborative economy?
Immediately after the earthquake and environmental crisis, a group of anthropologists, legal scholars, and
economists, together with practicing lawyers, bureaucrats,
and financial analysts in Japan, the United States, and around
the Pacific Rim, initially in face-to-face, telephone, or email contact, began to think about this aspect of the evolving
transnational crisis: the lack of understanding; the points of

disconnect and miscommunication, of distrust and duplicity; and the crisis of faith in each genre of expertise. We
experienced the environmental crisis and its international
consequences as a tragic confirmation that the tools of intellectuals and practitioners alike—and hence the intellectual
and technical conversations across the Pacific and across our
disciplines—had long been far thinner and less substantive
than necessary to the current moment. But above all, we experienced the crisis as existential—as the profound shaking
of our own sense of intellectual, political, and ethical direction. One person spoke, only half-jokingly, of drinking himself to death. Another stopped speaking almost altogether.
The available avenues for intervention—from volunteering
in the clean-up effort at tsunami-affected sites to providing expert opinion to government ministries—each seemed
inadequate responses to our crisis.
We began holding online discussions under the name
Meridian 180 on a range of topics from whether the consumption tax should be raised to the meaning of happiness,
and eventually we built a closed, online platform where
participants could write in their own languages and have
their text translated within a short period of time by postdoctoral fellows. What distinguished the collaboration from
most networks, virtual communities, deliberative experiments, or political pressure groups, many of which are also
cross-disciplinary or transnational, is that we began from the
standpoint of our sense of loss of any sense of the proper
questions to be deliberated: we were not collaborating toward some common goal, to which each could contribute
their respective expertise. We were simply living, side by
side, this moment of our loss of expertise and, with it, our
perspective on where we might be going.
It was a curious project. Its aim was certainly not
some liberal idea of overcoming barriers to common understanding through dialogue; members shared no such liberal faith in the power of language or deliberation. It did
not emulate the methods of another field, as does Kelty’s
collaborative project; the method and discursive frame remained firmly if implicitly anthropological—“ethnographic
response” (Riles 2006b). Nor was it a critical project, a tactical intervention in the political moment; members shared
no common understanding of what the aims or goals of political intervention might be. The project also differed from
paraethnography: just as there was no agreement about the
political goals, there was no shared conception of what we
might want to describe or make sense of through the pooling
of our expertise. Two years later, the project now counts
more than 500 members and includes a range of disparate,
disconnected “projects” of various orders and genres, from
a multilingual book series to a project to build a common
currency for Asia. But its wider goals and objectives remain as unformed as ever. At a recent meeting, members
pondered the question of what metaphors to use to understand ourselves. Possibilities that were proposed included
“amateur think tank,” “guerrilla consulting group,” “black
box theater performance,” and “intellectual gym” in which
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people could just get some intellectual training, side by side,
with other strangers doing the same. Yet what was different
about our project was the abandonment of any explicit aim
of producing knowledge—comparison, criticism, data, and
so forth. What we wanted to produce, rather, was in an
immediate sense a personal basis for survival after the loss
of our tools and the confusion of our politics. We wanted
some way to exist alongside others. For many of our group,
it became simply a reason to get through the day. Yet I
believe it achieved this because it held the ends of collaboration in abeyance long enough to allow us to appreciate the
means—to revisit each of our expert tools by redeploying
them, against and alongside those belonging to others, after
professional expertise ceased to deliver a sufficient space of
legitimation.
In retrospect, we can say that our collaboration retooled
anthropological technique in response to the collaborative
turn in market relations (Riles et al. n.d.). Recognizing the
paraethnographic condition and the rise of the collaborative
economy as opportunities as well as political constraints,
it brought the moment of ethnographic observation and
co-creation into the moment of technocratic-expert participation while remaining firmly grounded in the kind of
responsiveness that is the anthropological hallmark. For the
anthropologists among us, the collaboration constitutes a
field (what was once the taken-for-granted object of study).
For the financiers and regulators, analogously, it constitutes
an alternative to the market (what was once the taken-forgranted object of professional work). Our expertise was
reinvigorated by our willingness to play as amateurs—as
those who, like amateur musicians, historians, or literary
critics, do not lay claim to an instrumental purpose for their
work (no matter how skilled or dedicated they may be).11
If critique and anthropological comparison served as modalities of intellectual response to the coordinated economy, I
wonder if ethnographically inspired amateurism may serve as
a new politics of expertise in the era of market collaboration.
Annelise Riles Cornell Law School and Department of Anthropology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853; ar254@cornell.edu
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1. This temporality was the precise opposite of the future-oriented
modality of expert “preparedness” described by Andrew Lakoff
(2007).
2. We might distinguish three general periods in market–state
relations then: (1) the period of the developmental state, characterized by widespread faith in technocratic planning (the statecoordinated capitalism of Japan Inc.); (2) the neoliberal reform
period, characterized by a rejection of the very possibility of
planning, in which regulators substituted a faith in price and
private law rules as coordination tools; and now, (3) a period in
which all regulatory strategies fail to generate commitment and
hope—a moment of shouganai.
3. Janet Roitman has cautioned critics of capitalism to refrain from
unthinkingly falling prey to the market’s own language of crisis.
Drawing on her own research in Chad for whom what outsiders
might describe as financial crisis is endemic and unending, she
points out that the notion of crisis is parasitic on some vision of
an alternative condition of stasis and, hence, is always framed
as the temporary state of exception (Roitman 2011). While I
share Roitman’s concern that critical thought not reproduce the
unwritten parameters of capitalism, I also want to remain open
to the possibility that both the experience of crisis, and the experience of the lack thereof, may be more polyvocal than capitalist
logic presumes. As described below, for the experts with whom
I worked, the very ability to see crisis depended on certain
expert tools—tools whose failure engendered potentialities of
another order.
4. I do not identify dates of interviews in order to protect the
identities of my interlocutors.
5. As Beck argues, nuclear accidents cancel the insurance principle,
whereby risks are rendered calculable, because although the very
possibility of the risk of a nuclear accident is produced by the
calculating mentality; the risk-caused accident itself, once it has
occurred, is beyond calculability (Beck 2009:27–28).
6. “As computing becomes exponentially more powerful, it will
also enable more natural interactions with scientists. Systems
that are able to ‘understand’ and have far greater contextual awareness will provide a level of proactive assistance that
was previously available only from human helpers” (Mundie
2009:224). I thank Niranjan Sivakumar for bringing the fourth
paradigm to my attention.
7. In this respect, culture works here much like gender works
in UN practices and poses problems for anthropology similar
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to those UN gender analysis poses for feminist theory (Riles
2006a).
8. I have written elsewhere (Riles 2004) about how this notion of
culture bolsters the neoliberal project, and one can see it doing
the same here, biding time until a new market fundamentalism
can reemerge.
9. These debates revolved around which institution—formal legal
rules such as property rights (Hayek) or technocratic planning
(Keynes)—was the best institutional solution to coordination
problems.
10. As Deepa Reddy writes of her government-sponsored research
on local perspectives on genetic variation research,
Collaboration in this context is both enabling and limiting, I
suggest, but is nevertheless the overriding means by which a
heavily deterritorialized and disjointed field is paradoxically
given a (rhizomic) coherence of a kind, and new objects of
ethnographic study acquire definition. [Reddy 2008:52]

11. Anna Grimshaw and Keith Hart, responding to Edward Said’s
critique of narrow professionalism in academic thought, propose
that anthropologists rediscover anthropology’s relationship to
amateurism:
It might be said that, compared with the other sciences
and humanities, anthropology has remained in important
ways an anti-discipline, taking its ideas from anywhere,
striving for the whole, constantly reinventing procedures
on the move. Thus, as the boundaries defining specialist
disciplines give way, anthropology contains within itself
many elements of a more flexible, constructive approach to
learning about the world. These are its strength and creative
source. [Grimshaw and Hart 1994:259]

One unlikely model, they argue, is W. H. R. Rivers, whose
project
required the development of new methods; and the essence
of his practice was a spirit of openness. But, just as important, the example of Rivers reveals the potentially creative
connection between individuality and community, for he
saw that pursuit of his own eclectic interests entailed working for a collective scientific project. Rivers, in short, unified
within his intellectual personality both the professional and
the amateur. [Grimshaw and Hart 1994:257–258]
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Allal-Chérif, Oihab, and Salvator Maira
2011 Collaboration as an Anti-Crisis Solution: The Role of the
Procurement Function. International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management 41(9):860–877.
Appadurai, Arjun
2012 The Spirit of Calculation. Cambridge Anthropology
30(1):3–17.
Baker, Peter
2008 A Professor and a Banker Bury Old Dogma on Markets. New
York Times, September 20. http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/09/21/business/21paulson.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0, accessed April 30, 2013.

Barnes, John A.
1968 Networks and Political Process. In Local-Level Politics:
Social and Cultural Perspectives. Marc J. Swartz, ed. Pp. 107–
130. Chicago: Aldine.
Basu, Ron
2001 New Criteria of Performance Management: A Transition
from Enterprise to Collaborative Supply Chain. Measuring
Business Excellence 5(4):7–12.
Bauwens, Michel
2005 The Political Economy of Peer Production. http://www.
ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=499.
Beck, Ulrich
2009 World at Risk. Malden, MA: Polity.
Benkler, Yochai
2006 The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Benner, Katie
2011 Don’t Bank on a Japanese Debt Crisis Yet.
CNN Money, March 15: http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/
2011/03/15/dont-bank-on-a-japanese-debt-crisis-yet/.
Blok, Anton
1973 Coalitions in Sicilian Peasant Society. In Network Analysis:
Studies in Human Interaction. Jeremy Boissevain and J. Clyde
Mitchell, eds. Pp. 151–169. Paris: Mouton.
Botsman, Rachel, and Roo Rogers
2010 Beyond Zipcar: Collaborative Consumption. Harvard Business Review 88(10):30.
Chase, Robin
2012 The Rise of the Collaborative Economy. Japan Times, October 4: http://www.japantoday.com/category/opinions/
view/the-rise-of-the-collaborative-economy.
Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff
2000 Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming.
Public Culture 12(2):291–343.
Condry, Ian
2012 The Soul of Anime: Collaborative Creativity and Japan’s
Media Success Story. Durham: Duke University Press.
Cook, Scott
1966 The Obsolete “Anti-Market” Mentality: A Critique of the
Substantive Approach to Economic Anthropology. American
Anthropologist 68(2):323–345.
Cox, Rob, and Peter Thal Larsen
2011 Putting a Positive Spin on Too-Big-to-Fail. New York Times,
December 20: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/
business/putting-a-positive-spin-on-too-big-to-fail.html, accessed July 11, 2013.
Dalton, George
1961 Economic Theory and Primitive Society. American Anthropologist 63(1):1–25.
de Larosière, Jacques
2009 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU:
Report. Brussels: The de Larosiere Group.
Dodd, Nigel
2013 Nietzsche’s Money. Journal of Classical Sociology 13(1):47–
68.

Riles • Market Collaboration

Draghi, Mario
2011 FSB Letter to G20 Leaders on Progress of Financial Regulatory Reforms, October 31. http://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104ff.pdf.
Field, Les W.
2010 “Side by Side or Facing One Another”: Writing and Collaborative Ethnography in Comparative Perspective. Collaborative
Anthropologies 1:32–50.
Foucault, Michel
1979 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York:
Vintage.
2010[2004] The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de
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105–124. New York: Berghahn.
Issing, Otmar
2012 Too Big to Fail Undermines the Free Market Faith. Financial
Times, January 19. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/

567

f673c85a-42b1–11e1–93ea-00144feab49a.html#
axzz2Rydhdddf.
Jasanoff, Sheila
1986 Risk Management and Political Culture. New York: Russell
Sage.
2007 Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Johnson, Simon, and James Kwak
2011 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial
Meltdown. New York: Pantheon.
Juris, Jeffrey S.
2012 Reflections on Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public
Space, and Emerging Logics of Aggregation. American Ethnologist 39(2):259–279.
Kelty, Chris
2009 Collaboration, Coordination, and Composition: Fieldwork
after the Internet. In Fieldwork Is Not What It Used to Be:
Learning Anthropology’s Method in a Time of Transition.
James D. Faubion and George E. Marcus, eds. Pp. 184–206.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Lakoff, Andrew
2007 Preparing for the Next Emergency. Public Culture
19(2):247–271.
Mahoney, Chris
2001 The Collaborative Economy. Executive Speeches 15(5):
1–4.
Marcus, George E.
2009 Introduction: Notes toward an Ethnographic Memoir of Supervising Graduate Research through Anthropology’s Decades
of Transformation. In Fieldwork Is Not What It Used to Be:
Learning Anthropology’s Method in a Time of Transition.
James D. Faubion and George E. Marcus, eds. Pp. 1–31.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Maurer, Bill
2012 Late to the Party: Debt and Data. Social Anthropology
20(4):474–481.
Mauss, Marcel
2000[1950] The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in
Archaic Societies. New York: W.W. Norton.
Mitchell, J. Clyde
1973 Networks, Norms, and Institutions. In Network Analysis:
Studies in Human Interaction. Jeremy Boissevain and J. Clyde
Mitchell, eds. Pp. 15–35. Paris: Mouton.
Miyazaki, Hirokazu
2009 The Temporality of No Hope. In Ethnographies of Neoliberalism. Carol J. Greenhouse, ed. Pp. 238–250. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
2010 Gifts and Exchange. In The Oxford Handbook of Material
Culture Studies. Dan Hicks and Mary Beaudry, eds. Pp. 246–
264. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2012 Arbitraging Japan: Dreams of Capitalism at the End of Finance. Berkeley: University of California Press.
In press Saving TEPCO: Debt, Credit and the “End” of Finance in
Post-Fukushima Japan. In Corporations and Citizenship. Greg
Urban, ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

568

American Anthropologist • Vol. 115, No. 4 • December 2013

Morita, Hatsuru
2012 Rescuing Victims and Rescuing TEPCO: A Legal
and Political Analysis of the TEPCO Bailout. Tohoku
University Discussion Paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026868.
Morita, Atsuro, Anders Blok, and Shuhei Kimura
In press Environmental Infrastructures of Emergency: The Formation of a Civic Radiation Monitoring Map during the Fukushima
Disaster. in Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Daiichi (New York:
Routledge: Richard Hindmarsh ed. 2013) Pp. 78–96.
Mundie, Craig
2009 The Way Forward. In The Fourth Paradigm: Data-Intensive
Scientific Discovery. Tony Hey, Stewart Tansley, and Kristin
Tolle, eds. Pp. 223–226. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Research.
Murakami, Haruki
2003 After the Quake: Stories. New York: Vintage.
Nugent, David
2012 Commentary: Democracy, Temporalities of Capitalism, and
Dilemmas of Inclusion in Occupy Movements. American Ethnologist 39(2):280–283.
Ong, Aihwa
2006 Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and
Sovereignty. Durham: Duke University Press.
Paul, Ron
2009 End the Fed. New York: Grand Central.
Petryna, Adriana
2002 Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Polanyi, Karl
1944 The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon.
Rabinow, Paul
2011 The Accompaniment: Assembling the Contemporary.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rappaport, Joanne
2008 Beyond Participant Observation: Collaborative Ethnography as Theoretical Innovation. Collaborative Anthropologies
1(1):1–31.
Razsa, Maple, and Andrej Kurnik
2012 The Occupy Movement in Žižek’s Hometown: Direct
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